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G  R  T :
K   W   D  C
– Dino Jakušić –
Abstract: This article examines Paul Guyer’s claim that we should attempt to ground the principle 
of religious freedom on the basis of Kant’s arguments for religious liberty. I problematise Guyer’s 
suggestion by investigating a hypothetical ‘dogmatic confl ict’ between a scientifi cally and a religio-
usly grounded belief. I further suggest that considering Christian Wolff’s philosophy might provide 
us with an approach which shares the benefi ts that Guyer identifi es in Kant, while at the same time 
avoiding the issues Kant might run into that result from the occurrence of the dogmatic confl ict.
I start by providing a background to Wolff’s philosophy and explaining the notion of the dogmatic 
confl ict. Then I present a potential contemporary case of the dogmatic confl ict and try to see how it 
would be dealt with based on Guyer’s proposal. Finally, I consider what a Wolffi an solution would 
look like, arguing that Guyer’s project might benefi t from considering Wolff.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Christian Wolff, Paul Guyer, Moses Mendelssohn, dogmas, dogmatic 
confl ict, religious liberty.
Published online: 19 September 2020
1. Introduction
In a recent article, Paul Guyer (2018) argued that religious freedom, i.e. the freedom to 
practice any or no religion, is currently under attack in the West. Guyer does not provide 
a detailed account in what way or by whom this freedom is under attack, however, a cur-
sory glance at the state of the political discourse in the USA offers plenty of candidates. 
For example, in 2016, in an interview with ABC News, after his speech at the Republican 
National Convention, Antonio Sabàto Jr. claimed that the then US president Barack Oba-
ma was a Muslim, suggesting that whoever is not a Christian is implicitly treasonous and 
should be disqualifi ed from holding a public offi ce. When the interviewers pressed him 
for evidence or any coherent argument for his claim about Obama not being a Christian, 
the ultimate response he could provide was “it is in my heart” and “I have the right to 
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In order to counter this kind of attacks, Guyer suggests rethinking the philo-
sophical basis for the adoption of the principle of religious freedom. He fi nds Immanuel 
Kant’s arguments for religious liberty to be a promising ground for this project. Guyer 
then proceeds by directly comparing Kant’s argument for religious liberty with the ar-
gument presented by Moses Mendelssohn, and indirectly with arguments he fi nds in 
James Madison and John Locke.
In short, Guyer argues that Mendelssohn’s, Madison’s, Locke’s, as well as “much 
of eighteenth-century thought about religious liberty,” is grounded upon religious 
premises.2 Stemming from Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration of 1689, Mendelssohn’s 
and Madison’s thoughts on religious toleration are based on two fundamental prem-
ises: i) a non-religious “assumption that inner convictions cannot be modifi ed by the 
outward tools available to the state” and ii) a “Protestant conviction that only freely 
adopted convictions are acceptable to God, and that God has given everyone the author-
ity to form his own religious convictions, not having delegated this to anyone, let alone
to civil authorities.”3 For Mendelssohn, therefore, neither the state nor indeed the church 
can apply coercive means to infl uence religious conviction because this is both impos-
sible (according to the non-religious premise) and contrary to the spirit of (Protestant) 
religion (according to the religious premise). The only thing the state can demand is an 
outward compliance with its laws,4 and it can only “regulate external actions of churches 
and their members if these threaten the civil order.”5
In contrast to Mendelssohn and others, Guyer continues, Kant provides us with 
“the most extensive religious liberty consistent with public peace while resting on no 
religious premises at all … [but] only on the innate right to freedom …”6 According to 
Guyer, Kant’s formulation of the principle underpinning religious liberty is more ex-
tensive than the others’ because it arises as a corollary of a more general moral demand 
to promote freedom,7 rather than being posited as a special principle applicable only to
religion. It is also independent from either of the two previous premises, being itself 
grounded on the “Universal Principle of Right,” i.e., the fundamental principle of mo-
rality that requires of us not to hinder the freedom of any person, unless that person’s 
exercise of freedom were to hinder the freedom of another.8 From this it follows, Guyer 
argues, that one is free to do, believe, say, or act in any way that does not directly dimin-
ish the freedom of others. Hence any religious belief or action, or absence of it, must be 
tolerated and defended by the state unless it directly diminishes the freedom of others.9
In this article, it is not my intention to criticise Guyer’s reading of Kant and Men-
delssohn, or of other Enlightenment arguments for religious liberty. Moreover, I will not 
2 Guyer (2018): 311. Or at least, Mendelssohn and the “Anglo-American” tradition are, if not most of 
the Enlightenment thought in general; see ibidem: 322.
3 Ibidem: 313. Guyer argues that there is no tension between Mendelssohn being Jewish and this 




7 See ibidem: 322, 323, 326.
8 Ibidem: 322–324.
9 Ibidem: 325–326.
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dispute Guyer’s general claims, e.g. that religious liberty is in crisis, or that it might be 
benefi cial to utilise Kant’s philosophy to discuss the principles underpinning religious 
freedom and toleration today. What I wonder, however, is whether adopting Kant’s 
principle of religious freedom as Guyer presents it, i.e. as a particular model of negative 
liberty, helps us to address the attacks on religious freedom by the likes of Sabàto. 
Certainly, inane statements by one US actor cannot on their own prove that this 
type of religious intolerance is the main danger facing religious toleration today, but one 
thing Sabàto’s position can be seen as illustrative of is the tendency of public fi gures to 
provide statements of fact, backed only by an appeal to their sincere belief in the claim 
stated and their right to hold and profess such a belief. I would certainly not argue that 
the state should forbid or police people for believing or publicly stating groundless non-
sense, but the fact that some important public personas feel comfortable to openly justify 
outrageous positions on such private and individualistic grounds speaks to a worrying 
move away from common standards of what counts as proof or justifi cation of belief.10
While it would be ridiculous to state that Guyer’s negative formulation of the 
principle of religious freedom would necessarily lead to the proliferation of this kind 
of culture of belief, freedom-grounding arguments based on negative liberty seem to 
be less effective in countering it. If we were to focus only on the rights of individuals to 
hold or profess beliefs freely, we might miss an opportunity to develop a principle that 
would allow us to go a step further and fi nd ways of establishing a dialogue between 
confl icting beliefs. Therefore, this article has two general goals. Firstly, if we wish to fi nd 
a new grounding for religious freedom and toleration, one which would be based on 
general principles and not depend on any religious premises, and if we are looking for 
this in 18th-century Europe, I want to show that there are more options we can choose 
from than just Kant. Secondly, looking beyond Kant and the catalogue of thinkers Guyer 
engages with, I want to sketch an alternative model allowing us to think about the issue 
from the perspective of positive liberty, grounded specifi cally in an attempt to fi nd peace 
and reconciliation between differing positions on the basis of universally shared meth-
ods and criteria for fi nding the truth. I fi nd the possibility to formulate this alternative 
principle in the philosophy of Christian Wolff, and will present it through the context 
of what I call ‘dogmatic confl ict’.
In what follows, I introduce the terms ‘dogma’ and ‘dogmatic confl ict’ from the 
perspective of Wolff’s philosophy. I then apply the conception of ‘dogmatic confl ict’ to 
a hypothetical issue arising from a recent legislative decision in the US. On this basis, I 
argue that Guyer’s formulation of the principle of religious freedom might yield unde-
sirable results in certain contexts in which the discussion of religious liberty can occur 
today. Then I present a possible Kantian response to this issue, going beyond Guyer, and 
argue that it might also be unsatisfactory due to Kant’s requirement that beliefs based on 
religious grounds exemplify beliefs of practical, rather than theoretical, reason. Finally, 
I present a framework through which Christian Wolff might address dogmatic confl icts 
and religious toleration, arguing that several aspects Guyer identifi es in Kant’s account 
10 Many will be familiar with the famous Sky News interview with Michael Gove from the 3rd of June 
2016, where he stated that “the people in [the UK] have had enough of experts” – a statement that he 
justifi ed by calling it “a faith … in British people to make the right decision.”
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of toleration are already present in Wolff, and that the Wolffi an position regarding dog-
matic confl icts might be seen as more relevant than the Kantian position to some of the 
issues facing us today.
2. On dogmas
Today, the terms ‘dogma’ or ‘dogmatic’ are most widely used in reference to a belief 
held in an unwavering, biased, or unrefl ective way. Alternatively, they can be used in 
reference to a set of (unquestioned) beliefs that a religious group might subscribe to. 
In more academic contexts, we may speak of dogmatic theology, i.e. a discussion of 
theoretical doctrines offi cially held by a church. Some will also be familiar with ‘dog-
matism’, which Kant identifi es as a theoretical framework exemplifi ed by Wolff and 
Baumgarten, which his own ‘criticism’ aims to overcome.11 It is in this context of Wolffi an 
philosophy that I will be using the terms ‘dogma’ and ‘dogmatic confl ict’.
In Wolff’s Latin philosophy, ‘dogma’ is a term that designates universal truths. 
Wolff dedicates the fi rst chapter of the third section of his Latin Logic, fi rst published in 
1728, to discussing the utility of logic in differentiating between types of books. Books, 
according to Wolff, can be distinguished into those which “survey facts [recensentur facta] 
about nature or people” and those which “put forth dogmas, or universal truths.”12 The 
former are called ‘historical’ [historici], while the latter are called ‘dogmatic’.13 If we look 
back at the tenth chapter of his German Logic of 1713, which covers the question of how 
logic is to be used in judging books, we can see that not much has changed between the 
earlier German and the later Latin text. In the German Logic, we are told that “texts either 
treat of histories [Geschichten] or of certain dogmas [gewisse Lehren]. The fi rst, usually called 
historical, report either of what takes place in nature, or what takes place among people.”14
11 See KrV B xxxv. References to Kant will be given by stating the numbers of the Berlin Academy 
edition, except in the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, where references to page numbers in the 
original A and B editions are provided. It might be important to point out that Kant does not object 
to the dogmatic procedure (an a priori proof from well-established principles) which he sees Wolff’s 
method as exemplifying, but rather to dogmatism, which is the employment of the dogmatic procedure 
without the prior critique of the capacities of this procedure. For more detail see Gava (2018).
12 “… proponuntur dogmata, seu veritates universales.” Wolff (1735): §§743, 750. Hereafter: LL. References 
to Wolff are provided through section numbers of the relevant work, with asterisks (*) referring to 
Wolff’s elaborations of the section in question. When necessary, I also include chapter numbers. All 
translations from Wolff are mine, unless the bibliographical entry has been provided for the translation.
13 LL: §§744, 750.
14 Wolff (1713): c. 10, §1. Hereafter: DL. In the German Logic Wolff does not give the name ‘dogmatisch’ 
or any name at all to the second class of books. Another difference is that in the Latin Logic, Wolff also 
separates dogmatic books into historical and scientifi c dogmatic books, the fi rst of which only provide us 
with a survey of dogmas, while the second demonstrate or test dogmas (LL: §751). Modern examples 
of the two could be a school textbook and a scientifi c article. Using the term ‘historical’ to designate 
the cataloguing of facts is connected to Wolff’s distinction between three kinds of cognition – histor-
ical, mathematical, and philosophical – which correspond, respectively, to cognising a certain fact, 
a certain numerical relation between facts, and a reason for which a fact is or obtains. Wolff will call 
any cognition ‘historical’ if it results from accepting something as true on the authority of another. For 
this distinction see the fi rst chapter of Wolff’s Discursus præliminaris (hereafter: DP) that was originally 
written as an introductory segment to the Latin Logic.
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This does not tell us much on its own, and we should analyse Wolff’s texts more 
carefully in order to see what dogmas are. The fi rst example of a dogmatic book that 
Wolff provides us with is Euclid’s Elements in which Euclid not only enumerates, but 
in fact “demonstrates [demonstrat] fundamental dogmas regarding magnitudes and 
fi gures.” In the same passage, Wolff also adds that his Logica “lays out [proponit] dog-
mas regarding the directing of the intellect in the cognition of truths.”15 This tells us 
that dogmas are not exclusive to religious writings or beliefs for Wolff, and that they 
can be demonstrated or proven. There is therefore nothing ‘dogmatic’, in the common 
sense of our time, regarding dogmas.16 Dogmas will be found in every philosophical 
(or scientifi c) discipline,17 and to such an extent that the philosophical (or scientifi c) 
method itself is defi ned by Wolff as “the order which the philosopher ought to use in
treating dogmas.”18 
The example of Euclid’s Elements allows us to specify more clearly what dogmas 
are than the earlier claim that they are ‘universal truths’. They are, fi rst and foremost, 
propositions, and according to Wolff’s classifi cation of propositions, they are ‘theorems’ 
[theorema; Lehrsätze], or “demonstrative theoretical propositions.”19 Firstly, this means 
that they are distinct from ‘problems’ [problemata; Aufgaben], which are demonstrative 
practical propositions,20 and ‘axioms’ [axiomata; Grundsätze], which are “indemonstrable 
theoretical propositions”21 or “theoretical propositions drawn from a single defi nition.”22 
Examples of axioms Wolff provides are propositions such as “the whole is greater than 
its part” and “a square is a rectangular fi gure.”23 On the other hand, the fi rst example 
of a theorem is the Pythagorean proposition that the square of the hypothenuse of
a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Simi-
larly, all demonstrated theoretical propositions of Wolff’s Logica are examples of the-
orems.24 Axioms, therefore, require no demonstration, and their truthfulness can be 
derived defi nitionally, if we properly understand the terms in question. Theorems, 
however, are not defi nitionally obvious, since they are derived by “placing together 
several defi nitions,”25 and hence require additional demonstration through a proper 
15 LL: §750*.
16 In fact, ‘historical’ books allow for no demonstration and are of use only to scientifi c novices, while 
dogmatic ones must always be rigorously demonstrated, similarly to how proofs are demonstrated 
in mathematics. See DL: c. 10, §22.
17 LL: §752.
18 DP: §115. The concepts of ‘order’ and ‘method’ are central in Wolff’s philosophy, but I do not have 
space to develop them in detail here. The most extensive treatment of Wolff’s method in English lan-
guage to date remains C.A. Corr’s 1963 thesis. There is also a recent article by Gabriele Gava (2018) 
who interprets Wolff’s method in relation to Kant. For a great recent overview of Wolff’s method in 
German, as well as an account of Wolff’s identity between ‘scientifi c’, ‘philosophical’, and ‘mathe-
matical’ method, see Gómez-Tutor (2018).
19 LL: §275; DL: c. 3, §14.
20 LL: §276; DL: c. 3, §14.
21 LL: §267.
22 LL: §267; DL: c. 3, §13.
23 LL: §§267*, 268*.
24 LL: §275*.
25 DL: c. 3, §14.
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method for their truth to be visible.26 Due to this minimal defi nition, theorems and dog-
mas are present in all sciences, differing only with respect to their object, even though 
their purest employment is found in mathematics. Similarly, theoretical propositions 
found in religious texts are likewise theorems, and can be divided in the same way as 
the scientifi c ones and can be examined in the same manner.27
The fi nal aspect of dogmas that should be pointed out is that while all dogmas 
might be theorems, not all theorems are dogmas. This is because of another category that 
Wolff introduces that he names ‘philosophical hypothesis’. Philosophical hypotheses are 
theoretical assumptions that are posited in order to provide a possible explanation for a 
certain phenomenon, but which lack full demonstration. A philosopher is free to posit 
hypotheses, derive conclusions from them, and orient investigations around them, but 
must bear in mind that these demonstrations are grounded on an assumption which 
remains open to be disproven or confi rmed.28 Importantly, “[h]ypotheses should not be 
used as principles in the demonstration of propositions which are admitted into philos-
ophy as dogmas.”29 Dogmas are supposed to be universal truths and a hypothesis cannot 
yet claim this status, since the truth of it has not yet been demonstrated. Wolff’s examples 
of hypotheses include the Leibnizian theory of Pre-Established Harmony, which he sees 
as a hypothesis regarding the relation between mind and body.30 Another example Wolff 
gives is Galileo’s hypothesis of ‘Earth in motion’, the truthfulness of which Galileo was 
not able to demonstrate, even though he managed to show the utility of adopting it as 
an assumption for the purpose of calculating celestial motion, and which we are today 
able to elevate to the status of a scientifi c dogma.31
At this point it might be worth noting that it sounds somewhat strange to use the 
term ‘dogma’ today for an established scientifi c theory. For example, if we hold that the 
essential component of a scientifi c theory is Popperian falsifi ability, how could a theory 
be both falsifi able and a dogma at the same time? We should remember, however, that 
for Wolff dogmas are propositions the truth of which has been demonstrated by the 
proper method of scientifi c discovery, not beliefs held uncritically or closed to further 
revision. While Wolff modelled his method on geometry, there is nothing preventing us 
from arguing that some other conception of the scientifi c method, e.g. the one requiring 
theories to be falsifi able, is necessary for a theory to count as scientifi c. On the other hand, 
one may consider referring to scientifi c theories as ‘dogmas’ to be not merely strange, but 
dangerous, since it could be perceived as playing into the hands of those who might try 
26 This might remind us of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, however, 
we need to be careful not to confl ate the synthetic and analytic method, which for Wolff is related to 
the order of presenting scientifi c dogmas, with the analytic and synthetic judgment that are Kant’s 
invention. For more detail see Gava (2018). For Kant’s understanding and critique of Wolff’s scien-
tifi c dogmata as applied to physics, see Frketich (2019). For the critique of Kant’s distinction between 
synthetic and analytic judgments by later Wolffi ans, especially with regard to metaphysics and 
mathematics, see Beiser (1987): 194–196.
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to undermine established scientifi c theories by treating them as if they were epistemically 
equivalent to confl icting religious beliefs. This danger, however, arises only if we identify 
dogmas with religious beliefs and understand religious beliefs in a particular way, e.g. 
as beliefs held solely on the grounds of personal faith. This would make it a matter of 
faith whether one believes that the Earth was once populated by dinosaurs or by talking 
serpents. But this is not how Wolff understands what either dogmas or religious beliefs 
are. Therefore, I do not fi nd using the term overly problematic, especially once we are 
aware that the term ‘dogma’ in the context of this paper, and in Wolff’s philosophy, is 
not used in its everyday sense. If one fi nds the term inadequate, it could easily be sub-
stituted by the term ‘doctrine’.
Dogmas, therefore, are theorems that have either been demonstrated to be true 
(in the ideal case), or have been accepted as true by a certain community (more likely). 
Since it is possible for a theorem to be declared a dogma by a community, even though 
it might not fulfi l Wolff’s strict demonstrative conditions, this can give rise to what I 
will call ‘dogmatic confl ict’. 
3. On dogmatic confl ict
While the phrase ‘dogmatic confl ict’ does not appear explicitly in Wolff’s philosophy, by 
this phrase we can designate an occurrence when two or more mutually contradictory 
dogmas are discovered, or more precisely, when two inconsistent theoretical proposi-
tions are both asserted as having the status of a dogma. While this type of confl ict can 
occur between any number of disciplines,32 I will here focus only on the case of confl ict 
between what can be called scientifi c and religious dogmas. 
In his Preliminary Discourse, Wolff provides several examples of what could be 
construed as this kind of dogmatic confl ict. One of these examples, according to Wolff, 
is an apparent confl ict between Leibniz’ claim in the Theodicy that our world is the best 
of all possible worlds, while the Sacred Scripture, Wolff continues, declares all the world 
to be evil.33 Other examples he provides are: a confl ict between philosophy and religion 
arising from the theory of Pre-Established Harmony, as it supposedly requires adopting 
religiously (and politically) unacceptable doctrine of fatalism; Galileo’s confl ict with the 
Roman Curia regarding heliocentrism; an unspecifi ed confl ict between philosophers and 
“certain Fathers of the Church” regarding the roundness of the Earth.34
32 Or even within the same discipline, an example of which is the disagreement between Leibniz and 
Newton regarding the nature of the differential method. See DP: §158*.
33 DP: §158*. Wolff does not provide an explicit reference to the Bible at this point, however, it most 
likely refers to 1 John 5:19: “And we know that we are of God, and the whole world [Welt] lieth in 
wickedness.” Kant opens the fi rst part of his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason by referencing 
the same Biblical quotation. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni’s CUP collection of Kant’s works 
on religion misattributes the reference to John’s Gospel, rather than to his fi rst Epistle. See RGV 6:18 
and Kant (1996a): 457 n. 8. 
34 See DP: §§164*, 167, 163*. Wolff’s confl ict with the Pietist faculty at Halle regarding Pre-Established 
Harmony and other philosophical/theological issues is often referred to as Pietismusstreit or Causa 
Wolffi ana, for which see Marschke (2015) and Schönfeld (2002).
Dino Jakušić ◦ Grounding Religious Toleration: Kant and Wolff on Dogmatic Confl ict
19
We shall see later how Wolff resolves these confl icts, and what his general strategy 
for resolutions of this kind is. At this point, it would be benefi cial to refer back to the orig-
inal thesis of this article. Specifi cally, I want to claim that the possibility of an occurrence 
of dogmatic confl icts today, not in the 18th century, presents Guyer’s appeal to return to 
Kant for the purposes of grounding religious toleration with certain diffi culties. In order 
to do this, let us focus on a recent case that could qualify as a case of dogmatic confl ict.
On the 13th of November 2019 the Ohio State Legislature House passed the Ohio 
House Bill 164 entitled “Ohio Student Religious Liberties Act of 2019.”35 Some parts of 
the bill have raised controversy, specifi cally Sec. 3320.03 that would prohibit preventing 
students “from engaging in religious expression in completion of homework, artwork, or 
other written or oral assignments.” The section further states that educational institutions 
“shall not penalize or reward a student based on the religious content of [their] work.” 
The critics of the bill have argued that this would allow students to answer scientifi c 
questions, e.g. about the age of the Earth, or the existence of evolution, in accordance with 
their religious belief, and the teachers would be forbidden from marking their answer as 
wrong. The defenders of the bill, on the other hand, have argued that the wording sim-
ply provides clarifi cation to teachers on how legally guaranteed rights of free religious 
expression are to be treated in the classroom. For example, if a student held a religious 
belief that the Earth is 6,000 years old, they would still be required to provide a scientifi c 
answer but could not be penalized for additionally stating that they disagree with it.36
Taking the wording of this bill, adopting the interpretation of its critics, and 
imagining a hypothetical student who would be willing to put down the answer based 
on their religious conviction (which is also in confl ict with the scientifi c consensus), we 
can construct a thought-experiment allowing us to evaluate how satisfactorily Guyer’s 
proposal would fare when presented with dogmatic confl icts.
Let us think of a hypothetical student who sees the act of stating that the Earth is 
6,000 years old as an essential part of their religious expression. They also refuse to ever 
state otherwise, even if it would be instrumentally benefi cial to them (e.g. for passing 
an exam), due to an additionally held imperative not to lie.37 Under the interpretation 
proposed by the critics, this student could neither be prevented from nor penalized 
(through marking) for stating that the Earth is 6,000 years old since that would violate 
the freedom of their religious expression. 
There seems to be something inherently unsatisfactory with this result, as is 
visible from the fact that the defenders of the bill do not seem to be eager to admit it is a 
potential consequence. There is nothing strange about being free from state persecution 
for holding or expressing certain beliefs in confl ict with established scientifi c dogmas. 
No one should suffer state persecution for believing that the Earth is 6,000 years old, or 
for shouting it on the street to passers-by. On the other hand, if we consider religious ex-
pression as being protected from school examination, some strange consequences follow.
35 On the 10th of June 2020 the bill was passed by the Ohio Senate and is to be fully effective as of 18th 
of September 2020.
36 For this and more details regarding the bill and the surrounding debate, see the article by Valerie 
Strauss (2019).
37 Hence they side with Guyer, and pace Mendelssohn, by rejecting, or not seeing as relevant, the 
‘Protestant conviction’ that God does not care about outward compliance with the law. 
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For example, let us imagine three different students taking an exam with the 
question ‘How old is the planet Earth’? The fi rst student answers with the scientifi c 
dogma: roughly 4.5 billion years. The second student, however, does not know the an-
swer. They decide to put down that the Earth is 6,000 years old, since they have heard 
someone shouting this in the street, though they do not know why it was shouted. Our 
third student puts down ‘6,000 years’ as well. Unlike our second student, the third one 
belongs to a hypothetical Young Earth Creationist group that holds the propositions 
‘The Earth is 6,000 years old’ as a revealed dogma and holds publicly stating it as one
of the key principles of their religious expression.
This hypothetical situation seems to present us with a (quasi-)paradox. The fi rst 
student’s answer would be marked as ‘correct’ since the exam tests the familiarity with 
the scientifi c dogma; the second student’s answer would be marked ‘incorrect’, since 
it confl icts with the dogma and amounts to a wrong guess; the third student’s answer, 
with OHB 164 being in place, would need to be marked as ‘correct’, or, in some sense, 
not-wrong. If we compare the answers provided by the second and the third student, 
we encounter the issue that the identical proposition, ‘Planet Earth is 6,000 years old’, 
would be judged as both incorrect and correct (or not-incorrect). Similarly, if we compare 
the answers of the fi rst and the third student, we fi nd that opposing statements ‘The 
Earth is x years old’ and ‘It is not the case that the Earth is x years old’ are both judged 
as true, or at least that one of them is true, while its opposite is not-false. This leaves us 
with several options, such as rejecting the classical logical axiom of bivalence, adopting 
dialetheism, or providing an account under which the third student’s answer can be 
judged to be wrong, without violating the student’s freedom of religious expression.
This raises two questions for Guyer and Kant. The fi rst question is whether Guy-
er’s formulation of the principle of religious liberty would consider penalizing the third 
student to be a violation of their religious freedom. The second question is whether Kant 
can provide us with a solution to this type of dogmatic confl ict that would not violate 
his principle of religious liberty as formulated by Guyer.
4. Guyer, Kant, and the confl ict
What would happen if we looked at this example from Mendelssohn’s perspective, i.e. 
by assuming (i) that inner conviction cannot be modifi ed by the tools available to the 
state and (ii) that (the Protestant) God only cares about inward convictions? If these 
two principles formed our ground for religious toleration, what would happen? For 
Mendelssohn, the state can demand outward compliance, i.e. for our Ohio student to 
pronounce the age of the Earth to be 4.5 billion years, and is free to penalize non-com-
pliance. However, as Guyer points out, the second pillar is based on the religious dogma 
that God only cares about inner convictions, and we have already established that for 
our student God equally cares for outward acts. So Guyer seems right in pointing out 
that if religious toleration is itself based on a religious dogma, it runs into trouble when 
dealing with a religion that does not share this dogma. In that case, the question arises 
what happens when we try to resolve this issue using Kant’s principles, which Guyer 
interprets as follows: 
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… any exercise of freedom that is compatible with the like freedom of others must be 
permitted and indeed defended by the state … one is free to do anything that does 
not diminish the freedom of others in a way that one’s own freedom is not being 
diminished. You can believe anything you want, since that does not directly diminish 
the freedom of others. But you can also say or act in any way you want, before others 
or to them, in any way that does not directly diminish their freedom.38
How does this apply to our situation? The fi rst part of the principle, guarantee-
ing the freedom to believe or say whatever one wants, does not present any issues in 
the case of our students. But Guyer’s interpretation further states that one can also act 
in any way that does not diminish the freedom of others. Due to this, it seems that our 
student’s freedom to state on the exam that the Earth is 6,000 years old should not only 
be allowed, but in fact defended.
This is because it is diffi cult to see how our student’s religious expression hin-
ders the freedom of another. The non-religious students remain free to state their own 
positions on the age of the Earth. And, while one might say that the tutor’s freedom is 
limited because they cannot perform their duty, i.e. teach the offi cial position in relation 
to the scientifi c dogma, we could say that the same complaint could have come from an 
inquisitor of the state religion who would not be able to penalize people for not behaving 
in line with the offi cial religious dogmas adopted by the state.
It seems that under Guyer’s proposal, our student’s right to religious self-ex-
pression would be violated by declaring their answer wrong, and hence penalising 
them, since this could be seen as state intervention targeted against free, non-interfering 
religious expression compatible with public peace. The strange situation, in which an 
identical proposition is either true or false based on the ground upon which a student 
has formed a belief, remains unresolved.
To be fair, however, Guyer’s aim is to provide us with the fundamental princi-
ple of religious toleration that is not based on religious premises, rather than to present 
a complete practical system that would resolve all possible issues stemming from the 
principle as he understands it. Because of this, we should proceed by taking Guyer’s 
interpretation for granted and attempt to fi nd solutions in Kant’s writings that might 
resolve the issue of the confl ict as presented here. One place that might be promising to 
look to is Kant’s Confl ict of the Faculties.
In the Confl ict, Kant addresses the possibility of governmental intervention in 
teaching. Since, Kant writes, the aim of the government is to fi nd means to secure “the 
strongest and most lasting infl uence” on the people, and what the higher faculties 
(theology, law, medicine) teach are themselves means for securing such an infl uence, 
the government reserves the right to sanction what they teach. However, Kant stresses, 
when the government sanctions something in this way, it does not thereby teach, but only 
demands that certain dogmas [Lehren], and not others, be disseminated to the public.39
38 Guyer (2018): 324–325; emphasis in the original.
39 SF 7:19. In fact, Kant states that the government should not even attempt to teach or interfere with 
the truthfulness of dogmas posited by these faculties.
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This means that by declaring the third student’s answer to be wrong, the state 
is not actually directly sanctioning the student, but rather is preventing the tutor from 
evaluating the question in any other way. The action by the state and the tutor, thereby, 
does not resolve or even impact the dogmatic confl ict between science and religion. After 
all, according to Kant, it is not the role of the state (and hence institutions that publicly 
teach dogmas) to attempt to resolve these confl icts in the fi rst place, since this is the job 
left to the university faculties that operate independently from the state.
But while this might allow us to say that the state is not directly violating the 
student’s religious freedom, the same problems persist as before. While in this case the 
tutor cannot judge the answer to be correct, since they, as a ‘technician of learning’,40 
are required to teach only the dogma of their faculty, not judging it to be correct could 
still be seen as penalising the student on the basis of the religious content of their work. 
This is because the student would be put at a disadvantage depending on which dogmas 
the state has decided to allow to be taught. The same issue would apply if the situation 
were reversed, i.e. if the state decided that the offi cial dogma to be presented in edu-
cational context is the one of Earth being 6,000 rather than 4.5 billion years old. In this 
case the students who state the latter could also be seen as being put at a disadvantage 
for expressing the absence of a specifi c religious belief. 
This approach does not seem to deliver the desired solution, since it only pushes 
the question one step upwards, i.e. from the way a particular dogma is judged, to the 
question of what should be taught in the context of state education. Due to this, perhaps 
instead of trying to fi nd a way in which an educational system can resolve dogmatic 
confl icts without thereby penalising religious expression, we should see whether Kant 
can show that a genuine confl ict does not even occur here.
One way to do this would be to show that religious dogmas are not theoretical 
propositions at all, but practical ones. For example, in the Confl ict Kant argues that, 
because religious propositions are supposed to be gained from divine revelation, “we 
cannot give a merely theoretical interpretation of [them] … we must interpret [them] in 
a practical way, according to rational concepts.”41 Similarly, “religion is the sum of all 
our duties regarded as divine commands … As far as its matter, i.e. object is concerned, 
religion does not differ in any point from morality.”42 Additionally, in the fi rst Preface 
to Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant writes that if something (a concept, 
proposition, formula) is ‘borrowed’ by philosophy from religion, this does not mean that 
40 See SF 7:18.
41 SF 7:46.
42 SF 7:36, see also RGV 6:13–14. I am aware that the quotation from the Confl ict refers to religion in 
contrast to ecclesiastical faith and one could argue that our example of dogmatic confl ict would be a 
confl ict between philosophy and ecclesiastical faith, rather than philosophy and religion. Since eccle-
siastical faith might contain theoretical claims (RGV 7:37, 7:42), the confl ict between the two seems to 
persist. But while it might be more correct to characterise the confl ict I have been presenting, as well 
as Guyer’s discussion of religious freedom, as referring to the freedom of and confl ict with ecclesias-
tical faith, I do not think that this matters for my case. This is because Kant states that “ecclesiastical 
faith, as mere vehicle of religious faith, is mutable and must remain open to gradual purifi cation 
until it coincides with religious faith” (SF 7:42). This can be interpreted as saying that, as a vehicle for 
religious faith, ecclesiastical theoretical claims should be seen through their capacity to contribute to 
practical concerns, rather than theoretical truths.
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philosophy “encroaches” into the domain of religion, since whatever is ‘borrowed’ in 
this way by philosophy will be used only in the way in which it fi ts mere reason, and not 
in the way in which it was used in theology.43 Moreover, in the second Preface, he states 
that while there might be apparent confl icts between philosophy and revealed religion, 
if we were to look at the relation between the two not from the theoretical, but from “the 
morally practical point of view … then we shall be able to say that between reason and 
Scripture there is, not only compatibility but also unity, so that whoever follows the one 
(under the guidance of moral concepts) will not fail to come across the other as well.”44
If we were here to understand Kant as suggesting that religious propositions 
are to be understood practically45 rather than theoretically, how does this help our case? 
Adopting this perspective would result in the elimination of the dogmatic confl ict. This 
is because the proposition ‘The Earth is 4.5 billion years old’ would count as a theoretical, 
scientifi c, proposition, stating the astronomical age of a certain planet. On the other hand, 
uttering the proposition ‘The Earth is 6,000 years old’ on the basis of one’s religious con-
viction would amount to stating a moral maxim, e.g. ‘one should respect one’s elders’. 
Under this model, in which we treat religiously grounded propositions as prac-
tical, rather than theoretical, we can fi nd a way in which the third student’s answer 
can be judged as incorrect, without violating their freedom of religious expression. The 
student would not be penalized for expressing their religious convictions, but rather for 
presenting irrelevant material, i.e. providing a practical proposition where a theoretical 
proposition is asked for. The practical answer is therefore treated in the same way as if 
the student left the question fi eld blank, or drew a horse – an action that can be penal-
ised, I hope everyone would agree, without encroaching on that student’s rights to free 
speech or to artistic expression.
This approach appears to me to be genuinely Kantian, as well as to resolve the 
previously identifi ed issues with the dogmatic confl ict. It is also not unheard of to attempt 
to resolve apparent dogmatic confl icts between the Scripture and science by interpreting 
the propositions found in the former as allegorical, intended for moral instruction, or 
in a way that makes them compatible with scientifi c claims (e.g. by interpreting ‘days’ 
in the Book of Genesis as lasting billions of years, rather than 24 hours). However, the 
Kantian position does require accepting that religious belief itself (rather than just some 
controversial dogmas) cannot be theoretical, but only practical, which might be a hard 
point to sell. This is especially the case within the context of grounding religious toler-
ation, since it seems to only recognise those religions which see their dogmas merely as 
practical instructions as truly being religious. Moreover, by relegating religious dogmas 
to the sphere of practical reason, we move further away from the possibility of estab-
lishing a principle of religious freedom based on the common theoretical standards of 
truth and evidence. At this point, however, let us end with the Kantian account and see 
what Wolff’s reply might look like.
43 RGV 6:9–10.
44 RGV 6:12–13.
45 Stephen Palmquist (1992) has argued against the claim that Kant reduces religion to morality, 
however, it seems to me that I here do not propose a reduction of the kind he rejects. I only claim that 
for Kant religious propositions are to be interpreted as practical propositions, rather than that religion 
can be “eliminated” or “explained away” by morality.
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5. Wolff and the confl ict
I have spoken earlier about Wolff’s examples of dogmatic confl icts. The important ques-
tion to ask now is how he solves them. Let us recall some of them. Firstly, Wolff talks 
about an apparent confl ict between Leibniz’s philosophical claim that this is the best of 
all possible worlds, and the claim from 1 John 5:19 that “the whole world lieth in wicked-
ness.” This example, however, does not present a genuine, but only an apparent confl ict. 
Wolff argues that a genuine contradiction between propositions cannot arise unless the 
concepts compared are used in the same sense. In this case, he continues, this does not 
obtain since by ‘world’ Leibniz here means “the whole universe of existing things and 
also the series of things which mutually succeed each other in the universe,” while the 
Scripture uses the term ‘world’ to designate human race.46 Hence, there is no dogmatic 
confl ict here, only mere verbal disagreement.
If we have eliminated the possibility of a mere terminological inconsistency, we 
additionally ought to check whether the propositions in confl ict count as dogmas. Recall 
that dogmas (in the ideal case) are theoretical propositions that have been demonstrated 
to be universally true. Hence, it is possible that a certain confl ict might not actually be 
between two dogmas, but between a dogma and a hypothesis. When a confl ict arises 
between a dogma and a hypothesis, Wolff argues, the dogma is not threatened, since a 
dogma which is supposed to be certain is not challenged by a hypothesis which is by 
defi nition uncertain.47 The example of this Wolff fi nds in the theory of the ‘Earth in mo-
tion’, which the Catholic Church maintained as a hypothesis to explain celestial motion, 
while at the same time holding onto the theological dogma of ‘Earth at rest’. 
After these two qualifi cations, we need to ask how Wolff handles the situation 
in which the confl ict between dogmas is genuine, i.e. not a mere verbal confl ict, and not 
a confl ict between a dogma and a hypothesis. After all, the Catholic Church no longer 
believes in Ptolemaic astronomy, hence the theological dogma of ‘Earth at rest’ must 
have been abandoned for some reason. Similarly, Wolff puts forward an example of 
“certain Fathers of the Church [who] once believed that the roundness of the earth is 
contrary to Sacred Scripture, because they had interpreted certain texts in Scripture as 
being inconsistent with the roundness of the earth.”48 This brought them into confl ict 
with philosophers who argued for the opposite. According to Wolff, in these cases what 
was put forth as a religious dogma was not a dogma at all, at least not in the strict sense. 
For Wolff, the philosophical or natural truth cannot contradict the revealed truth.49 In 
these two cases, the natural truth, discovered by philosophers, only contradicted the 
erroneous interpretation of the Scripture, which the theologians realised once the natural 
truth was demonstrated to them clearly enough by the philosophers.50
With this in mind, Wolff devotes a chapter to the utility of logic in interpreting 
the Sacred Scripture both in his earlier German Logic and in the later Latin Logic. In both 
46 DP: §158*.
47 DP: §§128, 164*.
48 DP: §163*.
49 DP: §§163, 168.
50 DP: §168*. 
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versions, he argues that since the Scripture does not immediately communicate the 
meaning of the words God intended to convey (otherwise there would be no need to 
translate it from its original languages), the truth of any dogma that is derived from an 
interpretation of Scripture will need to be demonstrated using the same standard of 
evidence as any other theoretical dogma.51 Moreover, religious dogmas can be divided 
into the “same classes of truth into which the natural truths are divided and can be ex-
amined in the same manner.”52 Scientifi c and revealed truths cannot differ qua truths, 
so in the case that some two propositions that claim to express such truths come into 
confl ict, one of them (or both) must be grounded in an error. Since we can never be 
sure whether a philosopher or a theologian has committed an error in derivation, any 
genuine case of such a confl ict would require both sides to re-examine their proofs and 
their interpretations.53
Does this mean that there cannot be a genuine case of dogmatic confl ict and all 
of the theoretical religious propositions are simply differently derived theoretical phil-
osophical propositions? In a way, yes, but the answer is somewhat complicated. In the 
same chapter in which Wolff identifi es natural and revealed truth, he also states that “we 
need be under no apprehension that in this manner faith will be blended with knowl-
edge.”54 Moreover, while Wolff understands the Sacred Scripture as a book authored by 
God, and hence holds God to be bound by the same conditions for the good presentation 
of truths as any scientifi c author,55 he admits that, in the Scripture, God might use some 
concepts that refer to supernatural things, as well as leave some claims ambiguous, and 
we should be satisfi ed that He has done so on purpose.56 This leaves it open, at least in 
principle, that some religious dogmas can come into unresolvable confl ict with some 
philosophical dogmas. 
The exact relation between the two can be clarifi ed by looking into Wolff’s dis-
tinction between ‘articuli puri’ and ‘articuli mixti’. The examples of ‘articuli puri’ are 
propositions such as those concerning incarnation, virgin birth, and the Trinity. They 
are accessible only through revelation and are ‘supra rationem’. If something is ‘supra 
rationem’, then it cannot be demonstrated through rational principles, but it does not 
contradict rational principles.57 ‘Articuli mixti’ designate a different class of proposi-
tions, the ones that are both disclosed through revelation and accessible to reason. The 
examples of these will be the propositions treating God as the creator, sustainer, and 
governor of the world, as well as those treating us as creatures of God. Ultimately, Wolff 
51 See DL: c. 12; LL: 2.3.7.
52 DL: c. 12, §8.
53 DP: §167.
54 “Es ist aber nicht zu besorgen/daß solchergestalt der Glaube mit dem Wissen vermenget wird.” 
DL: c. 12, §10.
55 DL: c. 12, §4. These conditions are: 1) clear defi nition of concepts; 2) legitimate premise–conclusion 
connection between propositions; 3) not presupposing anything in subsequent proofs which was not 
demonstrated in the preceding proof. These three correspond to Wolff’s general conception of order 
and connection, best exemplifi ed by the mathematical method. For this see Theis (2011): 35. 
56 DL: c. 12, §§6–7.
57 See Wolff (1738): §454. Hereafter: TN1. Propositions contradicting rational principles Wolff calls 
‘contra rationem’.
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believes that between the two approaches, theological through revelation and scientif-
ic/philosophical/natural through reason there is a ‘mirus consensus’, guaranteeing that 
both ways of accessing the truth are ultimately compatible. Due to this, in the case of 
a disagreement between theological and philosophical propositions, we ought to not 
simply demonstrate the philosophical truth in question, but also pay attention to how 
this philosophical dogma fi ts within the context of revealed theology.58
How does all this bear on the dogmatic confl ict from our case study? We have set 
up our student’s claim that the Earth is 6,000 years old as a dogmatic, religious claim, i.e. 
as a theoretical proposition. Both propositions, scientifi c and religious, use unambiguous 
terms, referring to the age of a celestial body according to the standard measurement of 
time. Our situation here is therefore neither the case of a verbal disagreement, nor a disa-
greement between a dogma and a hypothesis. What we can also see, however, is that the 
propositions regarding created things are ‘articuli mixti’, hence they are accessible through 
both scientifi c reasoning and religious interpretation of Scripture. In the case of our student, 
their claim that the Earth is 6,000 years old can and should be penalized since, assuming it 
has been suffi ciently demonstrated that the Earth is older than this, their claim is simply 
false. As an ‘articulus mixtus’ nothing changes regarding the truth of this claim whether it 
comes from religious or scientifi c conviction. This means that the student’s religious free-
dom would not have been violated, from Wolff’s perspective, since their claim regarding 
the age of the Earth is false, and hence cannot be an expression of a religious truth at all, 
but simply an expression of their erroneous interpretation of what God has revealed.
6. Objections to the Wolffi an approach
From the previous section, we can see how Wolff would respond to our case of the dog-
matic confl ict in comparison to (Guyer’s) Kant. If we adopt Guyer’s principle of religious 
freedom without further determinations, our hypothetical student scenario results in 
an unresolved case of a dogmatic confl ict with certain undesirable consequences. This 
confl ict can be subsequently resolved, in a Kantian spirit, by treating religious proposi-
tions as practical, rather than theoretical claims. This dispels the confl ict and allows us 
to mark our student’s answer as wrong, without violating their religious freedom, but 
might require taking on board the idea that all religious propositions, no matter how 
theoretical they might sound, are in fact practical – a position that might not be uni-
versally acceptable between different religious groups. While one of Guyer’s aims is to 
formulate the principle of religious liberty that would apply irrespectively of particular 
religious beliefs, the case of dogmatic confl ict suggests that the avoidance of religious 
premises might not be suffi cient for achieving this result.
Looking at the issue from the Wolffi an perspective, the situation seems more 
straightforward. If a religious group were to claim that the theoretical sounding truths 
that they subscribe to are to be taken in a literal or non-literal sense, there is nothing 
inherently wrong about either option. All dogmas must ultimately be grasped within a 
58 For the discussion of ‘articuli’ as well as of ‘mirus consensus’ I am relying on the work by Robert 
Theis (2011 and 2018), q.v.
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coherent overall system. While the dogmas of logic, metaphysics, physics, or theology 
are different due to the subject matter they cover, ultimately they can all be harmonised 
in a way which will exemplify no confl ict between true, properly demonstrated prop-
ositions. There is no inherent reason why religious dogmas would not be theoretical. If 
a confl ict were to arise between religious dogmas and theoretical dogmas derived from 
a different source, one of the proponents must be mistaken, and their mistake can be 
demonstrated by approaching the question through the use of the properly conceptual-
ised method of demonstration.59 Due to this, penalising our student does not curtail their 
religious freedom. Since the answer they provide, according to them, comes in a form of 
a theoretical proposition regarding a celestial object, thereby falling under ‘articuli mixti’ 
rather than ‘articuli puri’, their answer is subject to standards of proof demanded by the 
science that possesses better claim to truth on the basis of shared standards of correctness. 
The confl ict is resolved without requiring religion to treat its dogmas as practical tout 
court. If the student, or a religious group, wants to dispute a scientifi c dogma motivated 
by their religiously grounded belief, they are free, and even encouraged to do so, as 
long as they engage with it according to general standards required for demonstrating 
theoretical propositions.60
One potential problem for the Wolffi an approach, however, could arise from 
Guyer’s criterion of grounding religious toleration on non-religious premises. In order to 
guarantee peace in the case of the (apparent) confl ict between the proponents of religious 
and philosophical dogmas, Wolff argues for ideas such as the univocity of natural and 
revealed truth, ‘mirus consensus’ between philosophy and Scripture, or God as the author 
of the world who reveals the secrets of Creation to His creatures. While this might not 
seem problematic if one is already thinking within the context of Christian theology, 
this approach might not be applicable to those of different religions, or no religion at 
all. It seems, therefore, that Wolff, according to Guyer, would be in the same position 
as Mendelssohn, i.e. his principles for religious toleration would be based on religious 
premises, albeit different ones.
However, while it is true that Wolff presents his principles of reconciliation 
between philosophy and theology in these terms, I do not think that we need to see his 
grounds for reconciliation as religion-dependent. Firstly, we should recall what was said 
earlier regarding dogmas. They are theoretical propositions demonstrated to be univer-
sally true and, more specifi cally, they are theorems [Lehrsätze]. For Wolff, any proposition 
is true if there is an agreement between the subject and the predicate of the proposition. 
Theorems, as discussed in the fi rst section, are theoretical propositions constructed by 
“placing together several propositions.” That means that in the proposition ‘The Earth
is 4.5 billion years old’ the defi nitions of ‘Earth’, ‘4.5 billion’, and ‘chronological age’ 
59 See note 18 above.
60 This does not seem outrageous to me, since we can fi nd examples of the groups who argue in 
favour of treating creationism or intelligent design as scientifi c, rather than religious doctrines, i.e. 
by arguing that theories such as the spontaneous generation of the universe, or natural selection, 
are either not demonstrated fi rmly enough to negate the theistically-inclined theories, or by arguing 
that there is suffi cient religion-independent evidence for the theistically-inclined theories. We might 
doubt the sincerity or effectiveness of their arguments, but formally speaking, this would constitute 
a legitimate way of proceeding from the Wolffi an perspective.
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come together. In the case that there is an ‘agreement’ between them, the proposition is 
true. Since religious dogmas are, according to Wolff, equally theorems (since they are not 
axioms or problems), the conditions of their truthfulness will be the same as for all other 
theorems. It is true that this will not hold for ‘articuli puri’, which cannot be demonstrated 
rationally and follow different criteria for truthfulness,61 but any theoretical proposition 
that is neither ‘contra rationem’ (i.e. self-contradictory), nor ‘supra rationem’ (inaccessible 
to reason, but not irrational), will belong to the rational world (‘mundus rationalis’) and 
will be susceptible to the same standards of truth and demonstration as any other.62 
This means that between ‘articuli puri’ and philosophical or scientifi c dogmas a confl ict 
cannot occur, since the latter operate exclusively within the sphere of the rational world. 
Similarly, if a religious group wants to claim that a certain belief they hold on religious 
grounds has an impact on how we are to understand theoretical propositions that share 
the space of intelligibility with the scientifi c and philosophical ones (if they are ‘articuli 
mixti’), they would need to present them according to the same criteria of truth and 
demonstration. The peace between the proponents of a religious belief and those who 
do not share it can therefore be grounded on Wolff’s theories regarding the nature of 
propositions, truth, and demonstration, rather than necessarily requiring any particular 
religious framework.
The second objection we can raise regards the level of discourse at which I have 
presented Wolff’s solution. The question of religious toleration seems to fall within the 
domain of ethics, politics, or theology, while I have primarily addressed it from the per-
spective of Wolff’s logic. It is true that Guyer’s approach to the question addressed it from 
a very abstract viewpoint, but at least he addresses the question from the perspective of 
Kant’s practical philosophy (i.e. as a question of freedom), rather than trying to derive 
it from the Copernican revolution or Kant’s theory of the syllogism. 
This is a valid objection, but I think addressing Wolff’s contribution to this topic 
from the perspective of his logic is important. Similarly to Kant, Wolff’s moral realm 
belongs within the sphere of the free human action. The moral purpose of our action is 
the perfection of our and others’ capacities resulting in happiness. This perfection refers 
to the agreement of free human action with the essence and nature of a human being.63 
The universal rule of free action for Wolff consists in doing what makes one’s and oth-
ers’ condition more perfect, and avoiding what makes it less perfect.64 This is the law 
of nature, which governs all human action, and all other laws (the divine law and the 
human law) must be derived from it. It is validated by nature itself without the need for 
God, and it would even hold if there were no God.65 This being so, it seems that Wolff’s 
moral philosophy fulfi ls the conditions that Guyer fi nds promising in Kant’s philosophy, 
i.e. the whole of Wolff’s ethics seems to be grounded on religiously neutral principles 
61 Although Wolff argues that rationality is still, in some way, inherent in them, and they can be ‘dis-
closed’ (patefacit), but not ‘established’ (effi cit) by the scientifi c method. For this see Theis (2011): 35;
Theis (2018): 247.
62  See TN1: §455.
63 Wolff (2010): §2. Hereafter: DE. For a more detailed account of Wolff’s ethics see Schwaiger (2018).
64 DE: §12.
65 DE: §§19–20.
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within the context of free human action. However, there are some very signifi cant dif-
ferences between the two.
As mentioned above, human perfection, which is the goal of moral conduct, 
is increased if free action results in improving the agreement between a human being 
and their essence. This means that the fundamental practical principle is ultimately 
guided by theoretical principles, since one fi rst needs to know what the human essence 
is in order to act with an intent to increase perfection. While Wolff, similarly to Kant, 
divides philosophy into theoretical and practical,66 practical philosophy is subordinated 
to theoretical philosophy, since it is subordinated to theoretical cognition. For Wolff, all 
scientifi c disciplines, theoretical or practical, depend on metaphysics for their certainty.67 
The important distinction between Kant and Wolff is, therefore, that in Wolff’s philoso-
phy we do not fi nd a differentiation in kind between theoretical and practical realm or 
theoretical and practical truth, with all of human cognition and action being knowable 
through and subject to theoretical cognition and the philosophical/mathematical method. 
Because of this, it seems to me that to fi nd a fundamental principle that could ground 
Wolffi an religious toleration, it makes sense to look for it in his logic.
The fi nal issue I would like to address concerns a possibly pernicious side of 
the Wolffi an approach. While his solution might sound simple, it might not be a very 
attractive one if we are looking for a principle to ground religious toleration today. On 
the one hand, Kant’s position that religion can only provide practical truths might be 
somewhat diffi cult to universally accept, but it might be easier than taking on board 
Wolff’s optimism regarding the absolutely univocal and harmonious conception of truth, 
and the possibility of developing a one-size-fi ts-all method that would be applicable to 
all spheres of human learning. Moreover, such conceptions of truth seem to be open 
to dangerous levels of abuse, with groups that hold power claiming the possession of 
suffi ciently demonstrated dogmas which they have a duty to spread in order to increase 
the perfection of people who are not in the possession of them. So while potentially suc-
cessful in solving the little riddle of an Ohio student expressing their religion by claiming 
that the Earth is 6,000 years old, it seems to be, much more than the Kantian position, 
open to abuse in order to justify religious persecution, rather than protect from it.
I accept this as a genuine issue and will not pretend to be able to successfully 
solve it here. It is an issue that recurs with any principle based on positive liberty. One 
thing that I can point to is the fact that Wolff, himself experiencing prosecution and exile 
due to his positions, aimed to formulate a system that would maximise ‘philosophical 
freedom’, i.e. a situation in which we are permitted to openly state what we think is 
true or false, and would oppose ‘philosophical servitude’.68 Philosophical freedom can 
only be limited if our actions were to endanger public peace,69 resonating with Guyer’s 
interpretation of Kant’s principle in which freedom can be limited only when it interferes 
with the freedom of others. Similarly, in his Law of Nations Wolff argues that no nation has 
66 See Wolff (2010): 332.
67 See DP: ch. 3 for Wolff’s division of sciences and the ‘order and connection’ that holds both between 
them and within particular sciences. 
68 DP: §§151–153, 166.
69 DP: §167.
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the right to “deny another the duties of humanity” on the basis of religious differences, 
compel another nation by force to adopt its religion, subject another nation on account 
of religion, or mistreat the missionaries of another religion, since “force is a means not 
suited to inculcate truth.”70 Hence, even though I cannot demonstrate that the Wolffi an 
approach to the issue of religious toleration is clearly superior to the Kantian one, or that 
every issue that it might raise can be suffi ciently addressed, it still seems to me to be a 
legitimate, though neglected, approach one can take towards the questions regarding 
religious toleration, and deserves to be investigated to a greater extent.
7. Conclusion
Guyer starts his article by claiming that the freedom to follow or not follow any religion 
is under attack in the West. If this is right, I wonder whether it is because, as he sug-
gests, we lack a principle that would save us from suffering such an attack, or whether 
it is because we lack common standards of truth that we can levy against those who are 
undertaking this attack. While the Kantian approach can be utilised to provide us with 
the former, Wolffi an approach can be developed to provide us with the latter.
My intention here was to present the Wolffi an approach as an alternative model 
from the same period of the history of philosophy. While this model is not without its 
drawbacks, I believe it presents us with an opportunity to consider grounding religious 
freedom in a way that shares the positive aspects of what Guyer identifi es in Kant, while 
addressing the issue form the perspective of theoretical reason and positive liberty.
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